
















In this paper, I argue that the traditional notion that complex systems, such as those
found in biology, can be fully understood from a sufficiently detailed knowledge of their
constituents is mistaken. My central claim is that the properties of constituents cannot
themselves be fully understood without a characterization of the larger system of which
they are part. This claim is elaborated through a defence of the concepts of emergence
and of downward causation, causation acting from a system on its constituent parts.
Although much of this argument can be read as having only epistemological or method-
ological force, the final section of the paper defends a more robust metaphysical reading:
even purely metaphysical understandings of reductionism such as are commonly repre-
sented by supervenience theses are misguided.
1 Introduction: No Need for Special Biological Laws?
Kenneth Waters (1990) has referred to the “antireductionist consensus” in the philo-
sophy of biology, so it is perhaps not too surprising that I find myself in agree-
ment with most of what Evelyn Fox Keller says. At the beginning of her paper, 
she says that she “could as easily have gone the other way,” and I would say that,
perhaps, she might better have chosen the other side. However, there are some 
passing statements in her paper with which I am inclined to differ, and I shall 
explore a few of these to see whether there may be some significant disagreement
after all.










Like Keller, I am a materialist. That is to say, I do not believe there is any kind
of stuff in the world other than the stuff described by physics and chemistry. There
are no immaterial minds, vital forces, or extra-temporal deities. Keller writes, 
however, that as a materialist she is “committed to the position that all biological 
phenomena, including evolution, require nothing more than the workings of physics
and chemistry.” Even as a materialist, I’m not sure I feel committed to this; but, of
course, that depends upon exactly what the title question means. A little unpacking
of this question may help to reveal where (if anywhere) there is a serious difference
between Keller’s position and my own.
One could start with a trivial interpretation of this sentence. If “the workings of
physics and chemistry” meant no more than the workings of things that were made
of physical or chemical stuff, then a materialist, such as myself, could hardly deny
it. But an ambiguity immediately appears in the phrase “physics and chemistry.” It
could be read—as I just have read it—ontologically, as referring to the things of which
physics and chemistry speaks. And for a materialist, therefore, it refers to the entire
material world.1
But on a quite different reading, one might more naturally think of physics and
chemistry as scientific domains, traditions of inquiry, or suchlike. Then, it is far from
trivial to claim that biology requires no more than the workings of physics and chemis-
try. Why should there not be biological workings that are quite different from those of
physics and chemistry? And here, I appear to be in agreement with Keller when she
denies that biology could be derived from the theories or laws of physics and chemistry.
As a matter of fact, much of the recent history of reductionism, as a philosophical
doctrine, has addressed the relation between theories or, perhaps, laws of nature. Classical
versions of the doctrine held that the relation in question was logical: laws of biology
should follow deductively from the laws of physics or chemistry. Within the philo-
sophy of biology, something that has surely received the status of a consensus is that
no such derivations are plausible. One holdout against this consensus might be Alex
Rosenberg (2006), who seems to suggest that the laws of physics, supplemented by
the principle of natural selection, would suffice to derive the whole of biology. 
I discuss this position critically elsewhere (Dupré, 2007). Even ignoring the rather 
serious problem that, as Keller notes, there do not seem to be many, or any, laws in
biology, there is a further problem that the concepts employed in different sciences
seem to be incommensurable. As David Hull observed over 30 years ago (Hull, 1974),
the relations between Mendelian genes and molecular genes are many/many. So
Mendelian genetics, a scientific project still very much alive in medicine and agronomy,
employs concepts that are incommensurable with those that pertain to the molecular
entities that, in some sense, underlie the Mendelian phenomena. And subsequent devel-
opments in molecular genetics have suggested that the problems are more severe even
than Hull could have known (Barnes & Dupré, 2008).
If the question of reductionism were merely a question of whether all of biology
could be derived from the laws of physics, then we could confidently assert that the
issue had been resolved. As I noted in the preceding paragraph, it cannot. However,
this is clearly not what Keller has in mind and, despite her ambivalence on the topic,
she has some willingness to be counted as a reductionist. So, again, what are we to
make of “the workings of physics and chemistry”?
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2 The Reductionist Principle
Suppose we are interested in the ecological system that includes lynxes and hares.
Everyone can agree, I assume, that, among the constituents of this system are lynxes;
and everyone can agree (or everyone I am concerned to argue with) that the lynxes
are made entirely of physical stuff. There is nothing else to be made of. The first of
these propositions is the one that the anti-reductionist will tend to emphasize, while
the reductionist will be more inclined to stress the second. But where should we look
for a definite disagreement between these opposing camps?
We have agreed that the lynx is made only of physical stuff. Sometimes this is
expressed as the claim that the lynx (or anything else) is “nothing but” an array of
physical parts. While this claim might be endorsed by most reductionists, even the
moderate reductionists who have abandoned deductive relations between successive
theories, it is liable to be treated with more suspicion by anti-reductionists. So we
might try to separate the claim about constitution from the “nothing but” claim. What
more is there to what a thing is than what it is made of ?
Of course, one answer to the last question that, again, everyone can agree on is
that it matters how the physical (or chemical) constituents are put together. In fact,
to make a lynx they have to be put together in a stunningly intricate way; and a
pile of chemicals that happened to be the very same molecules that could, properly
assembled, constitute a lynx would be no more than an inert heap of stuff. So the
reductionist’s claim should be that the lynx is nothing but a collection of physical
parts assembled in a certain way. So here, finally, is a proposition that we might
expect the reductionist and anti-reductionist to disagree about: if we knew every-
thing about the chemicals that make up a lynx, and the way they are assembled into
cells, organs, and so on, we would, in principle, know everything about the lynx.
Reductionists will generally endorse something like this, whereas anti-reductionists
will deny it. Let me call this, with the specific biological system lynx replaceable by
any system we care to investigate, the reductionist principle (RP).
An important feature of RP is, of course, the phrase “in principle.” Certainly, no
one knows how to explain all the properties of a complex organism in terms of the
properties and arrangements of its parts; the question is whether this is simply a
reflection of the underdeveloped state of our current biology, or whether there are
deeper obstacles, obstacles in principle, that will continue to prevent us from doing
this. The kinds of principles involved will distinguish a variety of different versions
of anti-reductionism or, as it is often called, emergentism, the belief that there are
emergent properties, properties that could not have been predicted (even “in principle”)
from a complete knowledge of the constituents of a thing and their internal relations.
(I should note, however, that this probably still does not capture any disagreement
between Keller and me, as she acknowledges explicitly the existence of emergent prop-
erties. It may be that we differ as to what they are.)
3 Strong Emergence
One conception of emergence, championed recently by Mark Bedau (2003), proposes
the obstacle to explanation as the lack of a general principle connecting features of
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the constituents to features of the whole, but holds on to the reductionist intuitions
with the idea that a fully detailed simulation of the interactions among the con-
stituents would generate the behavior of the whole. The behavior of the whole is
fully determined by the behavior of, and interactions between, the parts; but the only
way to get from the latter to the former is by a complete simulation. Bedau calls this
kind of emergence—which shares with reductionism the insistence on the dependence
of the whole on the properties of the parts—weak emergence. Strong emergence, in
contrast, denies such dependency.
I propose, here, to defend strong emergence. That is to say, I want to deny that
the behavior of the whole is fully determined by the behavior of, and interactions
between, the parts. And hence, the elements of behavior that are not so determined
are what we don’t know when we know everything about the parts and the way they
are assembled; and thus, finally, what violates RP.
At this point, we need to be rather more careful with the relations between 
dispositions to behavior and behavior. No one believes that the behavior of a whole
is, in general, determined solely by the properties of its parts, even for the most paradig-
matically mechanical systems. A properly functioning grandfather clock, say, the action
of which is powered by a slowly falling weight, will not function if the weight is
supported so as to disconnect its gravitational force from the action of the clock.
With few, if any, exceptions the properties of parts translate into the behavior of
wholes under specific circumstances. So, the most any reductionist should claim is
that dispositions of the whole are determined by properties of constituents, together
with appropriate surrounding conditions. With the important qualification that these
dispositions may be probabilistic rather than deterministic, let me, for the sake of
argument, concede this much. Have I, then, conceded what is important about 
reductionism? In earlier work, I have distinguished further between the case in which
probabilistic dispositions involve determinate probabilities of specific behavior, and
the case in which the behavior is possible, but in which there is no reason to think
that it occurs with any determinate probability (Dupré, 1993, Ch. 9). As a matter of
fact, I see no reason why the second case should not be characteristic of much that
happens, an idea to which I shall return briefly and tangentially in the conclusion
to this paper.
One way of glossing the previous remarks about context is to note that many, at
least, of the dispositional properties that appear to fall within the range of the pre-
ceding discussion are relational. An elephant gun has the capacity to kill elephants.
This is a property that depends on many features of the gun and many features of
elephants. One could deprive the gun of this capacity by fitting all elephants with
suitable armor plating or, indeed, by killing them all so that nothing any more has
the capacity in question. But it is natural to think that there is an intrinsic capacity
of the gun, the capacity perhaps to project a lead pellet of a particular mass at a
particular velocity in a determined direction, that underlies the relational capacity.
Relational capacities of a thing are quite obviously not reducible to any information
about the parts of that thing alone, since they depend also on features of the other party
to the relation. But the reductionist might reasonably propose that all the intrinsic
properties of the thing are reducible to properties of the parts, and that the relational
properties were deducible from a knowledge of the intrinsic properties of the things
related. The hardness of an elephant’s skin, the distance from the skin to organs 
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necessary for the maintenance of life, and so on, combined with the intrinsic capacity
of the gun to project a leaden missile, together entail the capacity of the gun to
inflict fatal damage on elephants.
So, here is a possible ontological picture for the reductionist. Imagine arranging
entities in a traditional ontological hierarchy: elementary particles, atoms, molecules,
cells, organisms, etc.2 At each level of the hierarchy, we can determine a set of intrinsic
properties of the relevant entities. From the intrinsic properties of entities at one level,
say atoms, and the relations between the atoms, we can infer the intrinsic 
properties of molecules. Thus, ultimately, the intrinsic properties of everything are
consequences of the intrinsic properties of their constituents and, ultimately of their
smallest (physical) constituents. Or anyhow, this will follow as long as we can take
care of the relational properties smuggled into the story. (Keller probably would not
endorse this reductionist picture. For she writes that biological explanations assume
“the dependence of the identity of parts, and the interactions among them, on higher-
order effects.” As will emerge very shortly, I take this to capture a fundamental 
deficiency in the reductionist picture.)
4 Complex Relations in Biology
Unfortunately, of course, taking care of the relational properties is not an easy 
matter. Sometimes these are simply a matter of location, as with the relative positions
of the elephant and the gun, and spatial relations presumably belong comfortably in
the realm of the physical. But many relational properties in biology are not that simple.
Consider, for example, the characteristic properties of enzymes. An enzyme is a 
catalyst, generally a protein but in some cases an RNA molecule, which facilitates a
generally highly specific biochemical reaction in a cell. The mechanisms by which
many enzymes work are well-understood and involve a variety of spatial and elec-
trochemical interactions between the enzyme and its substrate. Enzymes typically have
an active site, a small part of an often very large and complex protein, which binds
to the substrate and changes its spatial configuration or electrical charge pattern in
a way that reduces the activation energy of the reaction the enzyme catalyzes.
We may, no doubt, assume that intrinsic properties of the substrate and the enzyme
are sufficient to explain the capacity of the latter to act as a catalyst on the former.
However, the intrinsic properties of a large and complex molecule such as a protein
will very likely allow it to catalyze many different reactions. And as a matter of fact
it has become clear that many proteins do, in fact, have multiple functions.
Ramasarma (1999) lists over 50 proteins (or groups of closely related proteins) with
more than one known function (also see Jeffery, 1999). These alternate functions include
a range of activities in addition to serving as enzymes, such as binding or transporting
various molecules, inhibiting various cellular processes, or forming subunits of larger
proteins. Glyceraldehyde-3-phosphate dehydrogenase (GAPDH), for example, a common
“housekeeping” enzyme, is believed to act as an acyl phosphatase, an esterase, a 
protein kinase, and a Uracil-DNA glycosylase, in ADP-ribosylation, microtubule-
binding, t-RNA binding, amyloid protein binding, and membrane binding (Ramasarma,
1999). The number of possible functions of a protein molecule seems, in principle,
quite indefinite.
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Hence, finally, a complete knowledge of the physical and chemical properties of
a protein will certainly not tell us what a protein does. When we know what the
protein does, chemistry may certainly be able to explain how it does it; but that is
a different matter. The distinction between explaining how something does what it
does and explaining what it does was central to my earlier critique of reductionism
(Dupré, 1993). The idea is developed further by Pigliucci and Kaplan (2006).
Note, also, that it is common practice to say that a protein is an esterase, a protein
kinase, etc. In fact, the primary name of the protein just mentioned, GAPDH, indicates
its role in catalysing the transformation of glyceraldehyde-3-phosphate; most proteins
are named by reference to (one of) their functions. But being a GAPDH, a molecule
with that particular catalytic function, requires not merely a particular chemical struc-
ture, but an environment in which there is glyceraldehyde-3-phosphate to transform.
I take it that the point I have just been trying to make is part of what Keller
means when she writes of “the dependence of the identity of parts, and the inter-
actions among them, on higher-order effects.” But this dependence points, I believe,
to a fundamental objection to reductionism. Chemistry, alone, cannot tell us that a 
particular protein is a GAPDH rather than one of the countless other functionally
defined things it might have been. To be a GAPDH requires, in addition, an envir-
onment that includes the other elements that make the performance of its specific
function possible.
The point can perhaps be more intuitively illustrated by thinking of the quite 
different case of human capacities. As is most definitively argued in Wittgenstein’s
private language argument (1953/2001), the ability most humans have to speak a
language is one that would be impossible, in principle, without the existence of a
linguistic community of which they were part. Countless human capacities—to write
a check, make a promise, play chess, and so on—depend for their possibility on the
existence of a social context in which conventions or rules create the conditions for
such activities. No amount of knowledge of my physics, chemistry, neurophysiology,
or the like, could determine whether I was able to write a check. But the point also
applies, in important ways, to less socially embedded physical activities. My physical
properties do not determine, for example, whether I am able to move vertically through
buildings. If my legs function in the standard way, my ability to do this will depend
on the availability of staircases. If I use a wheelchair, my vertical mobility will depend
on the provision of ramps or elevators. Again, the capacities of a thing, as opposed
to the countless merely possible capacities, can be seen to depend on the relation-
ship between the thing and the environment in which it exists.
It may seem that by conceding that the actual capacities—the capacities that become
actual rather than merely possible in an appropriate environment—can be explained
in physical or chemical terms, I have conceded everything the reductionist really cares
about. Certainly, I hope I have conceded what is necessary to account for the 
extraordinarily successful practices of scientists engaged with molecular aspects of
biology. Here, however, it is useful to recall a banal point, though one that occasionally
gets overlooked in such discussions, that we are talking about science, not Nature.
Biological explanations are part of biology, not part of the world, and biology, like
any other science, is an articulated conceptual structure and not a repository of things-
in-themselves. I shall move into metaphysics and attempt to say a little about Nature
at the end of this paper, but, for now, I shall continue to address science. And the
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fact that biology—a science—works with concepts that depend on the larger systems
of which they are part, as well as on their constituents, is a fatal objection to the
claim that “it is possible to reduce biological explanations to explanations in 
chemistry and/or physics.”
5 A Misinformed Slogan and Its Contributions
The preceding point can be developed, as well as some of the main dangers of reduc-
tionist thinking illustrated, by considering the view that the genome contains all the
information required to build an organism. In fact, this view is still too-often 
promulgated by scientists who should know better, and widely asserted in popular
science writing. Probably not a lot of people, biologists or otherwise, who have thought
seriously about such things still believe this. However, a close look at why it is so
deeply mistaken will be a useful way of elaborating the difficulties with reduc-
tionism. I won’t dwell too long on the tricky concept of information. As develop-
mental systems theorists, in particular, have pointed out for some time, the concept
faces an impossible dilemma (an excellent introduction to development systems 
theory is Griffiths & Gray, 1994; Oyama, 1985, is the locus classicus). If it is 
interpreted in the everyday semantic sense, then it is obviously false. Genomes 
contain meaning only in a highly metaphorical sense. But if it is interpreted in the 
technical sense of information theory, according to which, very roughly speaking, a
source conveys information about a target when it reduces the uncertainty about the
state of the latter, then there is no sense in which the genome carries information
that does not apply equally well to everything else that is necessary for features of
the genome to have their normal effects on the cell. Without a complete tran-
scription mechanism, for instance, the genome carries no information; and taking
the genome as part of the channel through which the information flows, the tran-
scription machinery carries information about the same targets. In what follows, I shall
occasionally use the concept loosely to refer simply to casual determination.
But this rather technical issue points directly to a more fundamental difficulty even
with less pedantic interpretations of the idea under discussion. Strings of DNA, or
even real genomes replete with histones and other structural elements that make up
real physical chromosomes, do nothing on their own. Their involvement in the 
production of proteins is as part of a system that includes a very large number of
additional molecules and cellular structures, and although there are very special and
biologically important features peculiar to nucleic acids, singling them out in the
way suggested by the reductionist slogan makes no sense. There are several 
simplistic ideas that contribute to the continued popularity of the slogan, however,
and I shall briefly discuss three of these.
The first is what was named by Francis Crick (1958), presumably with a trace of
irony, the central dogma of molecular biology. According to the dogma, information
flows from DNA, to RNA, to protein sequence, but never in the opposite direction.
Although one should question whether merely specifying a list of amino acid
sequences that constitute proteins would be sufficient to specify the entire organism,
the doctrine that DNA is only a source of information, entirely immune to the 
influence of signals from its cellular environment, provides a powerfully reductive
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perspective on the economy of the cell. But, at any rate, interpreted this way the
dogma is entirely misguided. Apart from its dependence, already referred to, on the
transcription mechanism that produces mRNA sequence from DNA sequence—not to
mention the mechanisms including complex cellular structures, ribosomes, that 
facilitate the production of proteins in accord with mRNA sequence—the behavior of
the genome is affected by countless other molecules in the cell. It does certainly remain
the case that the important activity of the genome is providing a template for 
transcription of RNA molecules, but which RNA molecules are transcribed and in
what quantities is dependent on interactions with many other constituents of the cell,
and the actual structure of the DNA in the genome is constantly being modified by
these other constituents. Information, then, flows constantly to the genome from RNA
and protein molecules.
The importance of RNA molecules in modifying genome behavior is a field still
in its infancy, but one that is thought by many to be likely to revolutionize cell 
biology. A second simplistic view that is relevant here is the idea, once widely 
cited, that most of the DNA in the genome, perhaps up to 98% of it, is “junk.” It
has been realized for some time that only a very small proportion of the DNA in the
genome provided sequence that ended up translated into protein structure. In 
accordance with the central dogma, it was concluded that most of the rest lacked
any function at all and that, perhaps, its presence reflected no more than competition
for space in the genome among genetic elements that played no part in the 
functioning of the organism (Dawkins, 1982). However, it now appears that the large
majority of the genome, at least 70%, is transcribed, and as more is understood about
the variety of RNA molecules in cells and their diverse functions, it becomes 
increasingly imprudent to assume that these RNAs—and, therefore, the genomic DNA
from which they derive—may not play essential roles in the economy of the cell.
At this point it might be said that, even acknowledging that the function of the
genome is affected by numerous RNA and protein molecules, the latter are derived
from genomic DNA sequence, so that all that has been added to the idea of the DNA
as controlling molecule is a few feedback loops. Everything still begins with the genome.
This leads to the third simplistic view I want to mention. Sometimes, it is imagined
that all that passes from one generation to the next, through reproduction, is the
genome. Clearly, this presupposes the idea that the genome contains all the 
information necessary to build an organism, since the organism is built, and 
nothing is there to build it from but the genome. But this view is quite wrong, as
well. The smallest “bottleneck” in the developmental cycle is a single cell, the zygote.
And this cell contains all the machinery necessary for the functioning of the DNA,
and the rest of a normal cellular complement of molecular constituents and 
sub-cellular structures. The cell is an evolved structure which, far from being 
assembled through instructions contained in the DNA, is a product of several billion
years of evolution. Naturally occurring DNA is always and everywhere found as part
of such exquisitely complex evolved systems.
This brings me back to the central point that occupied the earlier parts of this
paper. The capacities of DNA are not merely consequences of its molecular constitu-
tion, but are simultaneously determined by the systems of which DNA molecules are
part. The best way to illustrate this point is by considering the ways that we divide
the genome into functional parts, genes.
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The concept of a gene has two rather different traditions of use. Its origin is in the
breeding experiments, especially on fruit flies, of the first half of the twentieth 
century, though the classic experiments of Mendel in the 1860s are generally con-
sidered canonical precursors of this work, and this research tradition is often referred
to as Mendelian genetics (Sturtevant, 2001). In this context, the gene was a theoretical
term used to track inherited features of the organism under study. The “gene for red
eyes” was the hypothetical cause of a pattern of inheritance of red eyes. Flies with
red eyes were assumed to possess this gene, and this, through Mendelian patterns of
inheritance and theories of dominance and recessiveness, explained the quantitative
characteristics of the pattern. Such a gene made the difference between having and
not having a particular trait, in this case a particular eye color, and it is an import-
ant point about this research tradition that genes were always, and only, difference
makers. Where a kind of organism showed no variation in a trait, there were no
genes for that trait to investigate.
It is uncontroversial that, in this tradition, genes were what they were only in a
very complex context. Even a quite deterministic view of the action of genes would
need to allow that only deep within the body of a fly would any molecular entity
actually make a difference in eye color. The same entity (if indeed it is an entity)
might appear in another organism with a quite different effect, or indeed might appear
as a production stage in a chemical factory making parts for organic computers. Being
a gene for red eyes is very far from being an intrinsic feature of a bit of chemical.
Of course, the reason for this is clear enough: we have identified the gene in terms
of its effect in a much larger system. Nowadays, we are inclined to think of genes
rather as sequences of nucleotides, and conceived that way surely they are simply
chemical objects. And indeed, we might suppose that the genes for red eyes and 
suchlike could now be identified with sequences of nucleotides describable quite 
independently of the biological context in which they appeared. As a matter of fact,
however, this turns out not generally to be possible. One of the major areas in which
Mendelian genetics remains a thriving tradition is in the medical genetics that addresses
single gene disorders. A standard example is cystic fibrosis, which is caused by a
recessive gene with very serious health consequences. However, there is no particular
sequence that corresponds to the gene for cystic fibrosis. Rather, cystic fibrosis results
from a large range of mutations in a certain transcribed DNA sequence (known as
the cystic fibrosis transmembrane conductance regulator gene) any of which render
the gene incapable of producing a functional product. If both copies of the gene are
dysfunctional, the disease state ensues. Currently, over 1,000 such mutations have
been catalogued. But not every possible mutation of this stretch of the genome will
render the gene dysfunctional, and in fact the severity of the disease will vary accord-
ing to the precise mutation. So, whether a piece of DNA sequence is a cystic fibrosis
gene is determined only by how it functions in the entire organism.
It might be supposed that things would be much more straightforward from the
perspective of the second tradition, molecular genetics. In this research tradition, which
developed out of the identification of DNA as the material out of which genes were
made and the resolution of the chemical structure of that molecule, genes are 
generally identified as specific sequences of nucleotides. Surely being such a
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sequence is something that occurs quite independently of any context? I have already
explained part of the problem with this thought. Insofar as molecular genes are identified
as templates for particular proteins, and proteins are distinguished by (one of) the
specific function(s) they carry out in the cell, then the identity of the gene, as it is
conceived as a gene with the function of providing a template for a particular pro-
tein, is, again, tied to a molecular context. And it is under some such description
that we are motivated to distinguish a particular sequence as a discrete entity, a gene.
But the difficulty goes deeper than this, arising from fundamental limitations to the
gene concept itself.
In the early days of molecular genetics, and nicely encapsulated in the central
dogma, it was supposed that genes were discrete DNA sequences that specified pre-
cisely the amino acid sequence for a particular gene product. Subsequently, however,
things have proved far more complicated. First of all, it was discovered early on that
genes (in eukaryotes, anyhow, the division of life that includes, among other things,
animals such as ourselves and plants) were not typically unbroken coding sequences,
but parts of the coding sequence (known as exons) were interspersed with non-
coding parts (known as introns). The whole sequence, exons and introns, is transcribed
into RNA; but, subsequently the introns are excised by further processing machinery.
Subsequently it was discovered that in many (probably most) genes this excision 
process could be carried out in different ways, resulting in different RNA products,
so-called alternative splicing. These RNA products were also liable to undergo further
“editing,” alteration of details of their sequence, prior to being translated into amino
acid sequences. And these amino acid sequences might subsequently be assembled
into a variety of different functional proteins. So, different and discontinuous parts
of the sequence, initially thought to be a gene, might end up in a range of different
functional proteins.
And this is not the end of the relevant complications. The early picture had 
discrete genes, separated by non-coding (either regulatory or “junk”) sequences in a
reasonably orderly sequence. But it now seems that coding genes may overlap one
another; they may be embedded within the intron of another gene; and they may
sometimes be read in both directions, as so-called sense and anti-sense genes, and
a particular sequence might be part of both a sense gene and an anti-sense gene. A
particular part of the genome might be part of several different genes. In fact, it 
now seems that something like 23,000 “genes”—in the sense originally assumed in 
molecular genetics—are involved in the production of perhaps as many as a million
proteins. It is hardly surprising that the process from the former to the latter is not
straightforwardly linear.
I have presented these complications in terms of genes, but the fact is that they
raise serious worries as to whether there is really a coherent concept of the molecu-
lar gene at all. The philosophers Paul Griffiths and Karola Stotz carried out a research
project in which they presented scientists with DNA sequences involved in various
complexities of the kinds just described, and asked them how many genes there were
in these sequences (Stotz & Griffiths, 2004; Stotz, Griffiths, & Knight, 2004). There
was little consensus as to the right answer. The best way to understand this finding
is certainly open to debate, but my own view would be not that it showed that there
were no such things as genes, but that distinguishing part of the genome as a gene
only makes sense in relation to some function that particular bit of sequence serves
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in the general functioning of the cell. There is, therefore, no objectively unique 
division of the genome into genes. Again I conclude, the conceptualization of the
genome, as an object of study and as divisible into discrete functional constituents,
requires that it be placed in the wider context with which it interacts.
7 Causation
We can also approach the question of the reducibility of the biological by looking
at intuitions about causation. One of the intuitions underlying reductionist thinking
is that, whereas it is natural to think of parts of an entity as causally explaining the
behavior of the whole, the reverse, causal explanation of the behavior of the parts
in terms of features of the whole, so-called downward causation, is somehow con-
sidered mysterious. (Downward causation has been the subject of philosophical
debate for some time, generally dated from a proposal of Donald Campbell [1974).
Interest has been greatly increased recently in the context of systems biology, of which
more below.) So it seems natural to explain, for example, the movement of my arm
in terms of a series of biochemical processes leading to the contraction of bundles
of fibers attached to parts of the skeleton. This constitutes a classic causal/mechanical
explanation in terms of pushes, pulls, hinges, and suchlike. It seems strange to many,
on the other hand, to suppose that the whole organism of which the muscle tissue
is part could somehow cause the necessary molecular activities. Of course, philosophically
untutored intuition may find the second possibility quite natural. The naïve expla-
nation of my arm’s going up is that I intended to reach for a book, say, which explains
the bodily movement in terms of a feature of the whole, its intention. If the whole
person is capable of raising the arm, and raising the arm is caused by (among much
else) calcium being pumped into the sarcoplasmic reticulum, then it appears that 
the person is capable of causing calcium to be pumped into the sacroplasmic 
reticulum.
Downward causation seems a very natural way to think of much of what I 
have been saying about molecular biology. What causes the human genome to 
behave in the particular ways it does—for example, various sequences being 
transcribed or not at varying rate, changes in conformation and spatial relation of
chromosomes, and so on—is a variety of features dispersed over the surrounding parts
of the cell. The behavior of the part is to be explained by appeal to features of the
whole.
Another example that fits naturally into this picture is the phenomenon of pro-
tein folding. A major problem in molecular biology is to explain the transition from
an amino acid sequence to the baroquely complex structure that results as this sequence
folds into a three-dimensional shape. The topology of this structure is essential to
the proper functioning of the protein, yet in many cases it appears to be strongly
underdetermined by the chemical properties of the links between successive amino
acids. It is known that many proteins require specific collaboration from other 
proteins, known as chaperones, to accomplish this complex feat. One might argue
that this was simply another interaction, between the folding protein and the 
chaperone, fully compatible with a traditional reductionist perspective.
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However, even if, as is probably a great oversimplification, interaction with the
correct chaperones were all that was required for correct folding, the kind of argument
considered with regard to protein function applies equally here. There is a very specific
environment, in this case one replete with appropriate chaperones, which endows 
the amino acid sequence with the capacity, or disposition, to fold in a particular,
functionally desirable, way. Still more is it a specific environment that disposes the
various relevant parts of the genome to produce, in the end, an appropriately folded
protein. And again, this environment is not something that could possibly be 
generated de novo by the genome but, on the contrary, it is one that took a few 
billion years to evolve. The cell, I think we must say, with all its intricate structure
and diverse contents, is what causes these contents to behave in these life-sustaining
ways (Powell & Dupré, 2009).
8 Systems Biology
A scientific development that has brought these issues of downward causation, 
emergent properties, and reductionism to the fore is the rapid growth of systems 
biology. Systems biology can be seen as a response to the growing realization that
the accelerating avalanche of molecular data from ever-faster gene sequencing and 
comparable technologies for assaying RNAs and proteins had not been matched by 
similar growth in the ability to assemble these data into adequate models or expla-
nations of larger-scale phenomena. Systems biology was conceived as a collabora-
tive effort among molecular biologists, mathematicians, and computer scientists to
attempt to provide such integrative understanding. In earlier work (O’Malley & Dupré,
2005), my collaborator and I distinguished between top-down and bottom-up tend-
encies in current systems biology. The former, generally reductive tendency hopes 
to build up more global understanding by gradual integration of information from 
molecular censuses and knowledge of molecular interactions. Top-down systems 
biologists doubt whether this can be done, and insist on the need for more general 
principles that emerge at higher levels of organization, and constrain the behavior
of constituents.
This is a relatively crude dichotomy, of course, and the consensus among biolo-
gists involved in these projects is that some combination of the two will be needed
for systems biology to succeed (Krohs and Callebaut [2007] offer criticism of the
dichotomy just mentioned). This is exactly what should be expected in the light of
the preceding discussion: the capacities of parts will require explanation through 
reductive, bottom-up approaches; but a top-down approach is required to understand
their actual behavior, and to identify the capacities that need to be explained. However,
whereas some top-down systems biologists hold that this is a matter of identifying
laws that govern complex systems, my own prejudice is that the top-down part is
more a matter of higher-level description of particular systems. One cannot infer the
behavior of a cell by treating it as a bag of chemicals; one might begin to make
progress by describing the intermediate structures – viz., ribosomes, Golgi apparatuses,
and so on – and the heterogeneous distribution of various molecules in relation to
such things.
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Reductionism is inspired both by observations of the methods of science and by more
purely metaphysical reflections or intuitions. Though, as I have argued, I don’t doubt
that reductionist methods have a vital role in science, I think this role can be over-
stated, especially in biology. A science such as molecular biology tells us not only
how particular entities come to have the complex capacities they do, but also how
complex systems enroll some of these capacities to create stability, order, and function.
In doing so, I have suggested, those systems constrain and causally influence the
behavior of their molecular constituents.
An influential movement in recent philosophy of science has attempted to
describe biological systems in terms of mechanism. (e.g., Bechtel, 2006; Machamer,
Darden, & Craver, 2000). I am generally sympathetic to this movement, and these
accounts have strong parallels, for example, with the view of top-down systems 
biology mentioned at the end of the preceding section. Although these recent
accounts of mechanism do not rest a great deal on the implicit parallel with
machines, this parallel does have serious disadvantages, as well as some virtues.
On the positive side, machines, like organisms, exploit capacities of their constituents
to create order and predictable behavior. But there are important differences. The
machines we construct typically have a fixed set of parts, and those parts are
invariably subject to decay and failure over time. Organisms, in contrast, constantly
renew and replace their parts, often with different ones. Organisms have life cycles;
machines have only a linear progression toward decay.
However, both machines and organism illustrate one very important point. Order
is difficult to achieve. Machines achieve it with all kinds of ingenuity, and auxiliary
devices that anticipate, and sometimes prevent, the common causes of failure.
Organisms maintain order with stunningly complex arrays of interacting parts, the
“Bernard machines” eloquently described in Keller’s paper, and much else besides.
Also, I maintain, these order-preserving systems work by creating synergies of
mutual determination between different levels of organization. Although this last point
may indicate a fundamental difference between machines and organisms, there is a
crucial point in emphasizing their similarity, namely, to indicate the dubiousness of
an intuition that underlies much reductionist thinking. This is the idea that order is
everywhere, i.e., that everything is determined by the unvarying capacities of micro-
scopic constituents; and it is not at all borne out by a close study of the systems
that do manage to maintain order and predictability. Biological order, I argue, is the
extraordinary achievement of systems honed by billions of years of evolution. It is
not something that comes for free with the determinism of the physical and 
chemical worlds.
Throughout this paper, I have been concerned to engage with reductionism as a
serious aspect of scientific methodology. I have tried to produce an account that does
justice to the undoubted importance that working scientists attach to reductionist 
methods, while avoiding philosophical conclusions that go beyond what such a 
concern requires. However, a great deal of philosophical discussion involves much
weaker notions that have no such connections with scientific methodology, actual
or even imaginable. Perhaps the most widely discussed, and certainly of no threatened
relevance to science, are various theses of “supervenience,” a form of reductionism
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sometimes considered so weak that any sane person must accept it. Indeed, 
supervenience is often thought to be a paradigmatic form of anti-reductionism. A
thesis of the supervenience of the biological on the physical asserts that, however
inaccessible are principles connecting lower levels to higher levels, nevertheless, the
biological depends on the physical in the sense that for any biological system there
is a physical state that constitutes it, and wherever we were to find an identical 
physical state we would find an identical biological state.
It should be obvious what my worry with such a position will be. Perhaps this
would be true for any closed biological system, but then there are no closed 
biological systems. This is one way of understanding the dependence of the identity
of biological entities on context that I have emphasized in this paper. Bounded 
biological systems do not supervene on their physical parts because aspects of what
they are depend on the context with which they interact, a context always extending
beyond any predetermined boundaries. Perhaps I should concede that everything in
the universe supervenes on the total physical state of the universe? Perhaps. But,
here, we are so deeply into the domain of purely speculative metaphysics that I more
than happy to remain agnostic.
Postscript: Counterpoint
I still find the differences between myself and Evelyn Fox Keller to be slight. I shall
make some very brief responses to the points that Keller raises in the postscript to
her paper. While I agree that “it is important to distinguish interactions, behavior,
and properties,” the properties with which I am most concerned are capacities, 
and capacities, I take it, are defined in terms of the behavior that is their character-
istic exercise. Moreover, capacities, I argue, are jointly determined by intrinsic 
features of an entity and by features of its environment. So though interactions, 
behavior, and properties should be distinguished, they are, I would argue, intimately
connected.
On downward causation, I cannot see anything in Keller’s postscript with which
I disagree. It may be that something in the main body of my text gives a contrary
impression, but I am unable to see the disagreement. I am, of course, happy if there
is none.
Finally on the question of context and interaction, I agree that there is no absolute
or objective distinction here. However, it seems to me that there is a useful pragmatic
distinction. I have used the word “context” to refer to features of an object’s 
environment that are necessary to confer on the object a particular capacity, as just
explained. Interactions are simply the exercise of such capacities with relation to some
other entity that will presumably constitute all or part of that context. So clearly
there is no way of saying of a particular feature of the environment that it is 
objectively part of the context rather than something with which the entity 
interacts. However, I would say that the project of characterizing the entity, which
I have said requires reference to the context, and the project of describing what, on
a particular occasion, it does, namely, interact, are distinct activities. And it is only
as a means to discriminate these intellectual activities that I would defend the 
distinction in my text, such as it is, between context and interaction.
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Notes
1 Incidentally, the disjunction here and the inclusive disjunction in the title are somewhat
problematic. If strong doctrines of reductionism are true, then chemistry is reducible to
physics. Hereafter, I shall generally refer just to physics, though, of course, any practical
scientific project will surely be happy with a reduction to chemistry.
2 I won’t worry here exactly what are the appropriate steps in the hierarchy. As a matter of
fact, I am increasingly skeptical whether there really is such a hierarchy rather than a 
number of points at which we have found it useful to abstract objects of particular degrees
of complexity. For example, we typically think of multicellular organisms as distinct from
the multitudes of microbes with which they are in an obligate symbiotic relationship, but
this is not appropriate for all purposes. The argument below concerning the contextual
dependence of the identity of biological entities points more generally in this direction,
but I won’t develop the point any further here.
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